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The Puzzle of Centre-Right Parties Favouring Open Immigration Entry Policies 
 
On the morning of 20 September 2010 Swedes woke up to a new political landscape. The 
openly xenophobic “Sweden Democrats” (SD / Sverigedemokraterna) had, with 5.7% of 
the votes at the general election, comfortably gained Riksdag (parliament) representation 
for the first time. However, although newly elected, signs had existed for nearly a decade 
of its impending political breakthrough, as SD had steadily increased its representation in 
the country’s regional and local political administrations throughout the 2000s. Moreover, 
while the party’s success may have been a sea change in Swedish politics, it was not the 
first time a far-right populist party had broken through nationally.  The “New Democracy” 
(NYD / Ny Demokrati) party gained nearly seven percent of the seats during the 1991 
Riksdag election, before losing practically all of its votes in 1994.   
 
Conventional wisdom, as presented in a host of previous research, would expect existing 
parties, and the centre-right parties (or in a slightly wider sense, the non-socialist parties1) 
in particular to react to the new party system context and voter threat by adopting anti-
immigration policies (Bale 2003, 2004). Strict immigration policies as a feature of right-of-
centre parties have been described as the norm in Western Europe (Neumayer 2005), as 
well as for Sweden’s Nordic neighbours (Green-Pedersen & Odmalm 2008;   Gudbrandsen 
2010). Thus, the pressure towards stricter policies among Swedish non-socialist parties 
                                                
1While much of the literature uses the label ‘centre-right parties’ we prefer the term 
‘non-socialist parties’ in order unequivocally to include the Greens. NB please note 
that the non-socialist cabinets in place 1991-94 and 2006- have not included the 
Greens. 
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should have been apparent at least during the 1991-94 period and increasingly, from the 
early 2000s onward.   
 
However, throughout this period, Swedish non-socialist parties have refrained from 
adapting to anti-immigration sentiments and moving towards stricter entry policies. 
Moreover, they have done the exact opposite, formulating more open policies, and when in 
government, implementing these measures. Sweden clearly appears to be a deviant case 
(Dahlström & Esaiasson 2010). In different entry policy instances, and at different times, 
various non-socialist parties have been present and leading the charge to make it easier for 
people to enter and settle in Sweden.  It is not an exagerration to say that where there is a 
debate over entry policy in Sweden, at least one non-socialist party advocating a less 
restrictive stance. 
  
This puzzling development of non-socialist parties formulating open entry policies appears 
to be a distinctive feature of the overall 1991-2011 period. However, it applies particularly 
well to the 1991-94 period as to the post 2002 period. Not only was the xenophobic threat 
heightened then, but non-socialist parties were either serious contenders for government or 
in governing coalitions and should have been particularly vulnerable.2 
Moreover, several of these comparatively open entry policies were formulated amid fierce 
opposition from the Social Democrats. In 1993, the non-socialist government granted 
50,000 Bosnian refugees permanent residence permit – the Social Democrats instead 
proposed temporary permits and efforts to keep the refugees closer to their homeland, a 
policy the party had introduced already in 1989. Likewise, against strong Social 
                                                
2The Moderates (“Moderaterna”), the Liberals, the Centre Party and the Christian 
Democrats. 
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Democratic opposition, in 2008 the non-socialist government lifted most bars, in place 
since the late 1960s, against labour migration for third-country nationals (TCNs) (Hinnfors 
et al 2011). While these less restrictive measures were heavily criticised by the xenophobic 
parties, non-socialist parties did not accommodate them through support for restrictive 
migration policies.  
 
In sum, we are presented with several puzzles concerning the surprising immigration entry 
policy openness found among Swedish non-socialist parties. Why do non-socialist parties 
formulate open policies where previous research would expect them to be restrictive? In 
the following we consider various potential explanations for these comparatively open 
stances adopted by Swedish non-socialist parties. Table 1 provides a preliminary overview 
of Swedish parties’ 1989-2011 immigration entry policy stances. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In this paper, our aim is twofold.  First, we describe the entry policy preferences of 
Swedish political parties towards labour migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, with a 
special focus on non-socialist parties. Second, following our documentation of the open 
stance adopted by non-socialist parties, we discuss some explanatory challenges regarding 
why parties formulate open entry policies, calling attention to ideology as an under-utilized 
variable and strong contender in the cases at hand.  We stress that our focus is only on 
formal entry policies, and does not address integration policy measures for those migrants 
who have been legally admitted.     
 
Theoretical Challenges 
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While this paper represents a work in progress, and further analysis is required, we 
nonetheless develop an argument that conventional explanations alone are insufficient for 
understanding the entry policy preferences of non-socialist parties.  Mainstream parties all, 
to a greater or lesser extent, operate in a strategic climate where inter-party competition, 
public opinion, and the desire to implement effective policy matter for shaping preferences.  
But, as we will show, none of these factors – alone or in conjunction with one another – are 
sufficient determinants of the stances adopted by non-socialist parties.  A more nuanced 
understanding of how non-socialist parties make sense of the strategic environment 
associated with entry policies also requires a consideration of the potential role played by 
party ideology. 
 
With few exceptions, previous research on parties and immigration policy has focused on 
the phenomenon of populist xenophobic parties and their consequences. In particular, 
research has asked why parties formulate restrictive policies, i.e. why parties drift towards 
limiting the numbers of refugees and labour migrants by limiting the number to be 
admitted or tightening conditions for their admission. Another strand of literature 
highlights whether immigration policies become politicised (Perlmutter 1996; Dahlström & 
Esaiasson 2010; Odmalm 2010; Money 1999). Moreover, almost exclusively, previous 
research has equated restrictive immigration entry policies with right-of-centre/non-
socialist political parties, whereas open policies have been equated with left-of-
centre/socialist parties (Schain 2008: 468). However, as our introductory puzzle indicates, 
and as discussed in Hinnfors et al (2011) this generalization may not necessarily apply in 
all cases.  In Sweden, the Social Democrats have continuously proposed a number of 
policy changes either to make entry policies stricter or to preserve strict elements. 
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While only very few studies on left-of-centre parties exist, there is a rich and varied 
literature on non-socialist parties’ entry policies, almost all of which aim at explaining why 
these parties choose to formulate strict immigration entry policies. Among the various 
explanations, key ones include vote maximisation (Money 1999), party system threat from 
new xenophobic parties (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008; Schain 2008), and agenda 
setting capacity of the xenophobic right (Schain 2008: 469). 
 
Our aim is not to present a white-washed picture of the behaviour of non-socialist parties 
when it comes to migration policy preferences.  Indeed, as we will show, these parties have 
not consistently supported liberal migration policies, particularly in the instance of asylum 
policy. Our data does allow us to make two claims though.  First, the portrayal of non-
socialist parties’ migration policies as being predominantly restrictive is dramatically 
exaggerated.  Over the past several decades it is traditional centre-right parties, and the 
Greens (collectively termed as the non-socialist parties), that have been at the forefront of 
the push for more open doors when it comes to immigration to Sweden, and not the centre-
left (in particular the Social Democrats).  Second, not all non-socialist parties have 
consistently formulated open policies. On many issues, the Moderate Party3 have formed 
an alliance with the Social Democrats regarding refugee policy. However, in 1991-94, as 
well as from the early 2000s onwards, the appearance of the xenophobic parliamentary 
                                                
3 Please note that in the Swedish party system the Moderates (‘Moderaterna’) occupy 
roughly the same position as ‘Conservative’ parties would occupy in many other party 
systems. However, whereas conservatism as an ideology may still be part of the 
foundation for many European parties the Swedish Moderates gradually shed most of 
its conservative roots in favour of a distinctly more liberal underpinning between 
1982-91. Lately the party has made further moves to the centre ground adopting 
positions based on social liberalism. 
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threat to the right triggered off  a chain of events resulting in drastically more open 
Moderate Party policies, in line with the three other coalition partners and the Greens. 
The stance of the Moderate party only adds to our puzzlement. Overall, the non-socialist 
group of parties has behaved in a way that contradicts the image of ‘right’ being restrictive 
and ‘left’ being ‘open’. What is more, each individual non-socialist party, including the 
Moderates, has acted completely against what would be expected when the threat from 
xenophobic parties was at its peak in Swedish political history.. In this paper we will 
discuss these puzzles, which boil down to the key question: why have Swedish non-
socialist parties formulated open immigration policies? 
  
A popular theme in the migration policy literature is an emphasis on vote-maximising as a 
key explanatory variable (Money 1999). Right-wing and populist parties are by far the 
most common objectives of these studies (Bale 2008; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; 
Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008; Kitschelt 1997; Rydgren 2005; Rydgren and Widfeldt 
2004; Smith 2008). Naturally, vote maximising is important as parties need to win 
elections. However, something must be missing in earlier research. Our analysis shows that 
non-socialist support for generous entry policies is largely consistent over the past several 
decades, regardless of efforts by far-right populist parties, or the left-of-centre parties, to 
see more restrictive entry policies enacted.  Nor have non-socialist parties’ policies varied 
according to public opinion development. Swedish centre-right parties have been at the 
fore of all major liberalizations in Swedish migration policy in the last two decades, 
including wide-scale permanent residence permits for refugees, and a dramatic 
liberalisation of labour migration policies. Thus, we feel it might be warranted to put a 
question mark around vote maximisation and minimisation of party system threats as 
explanatory variables on their own. 
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Alongside these more traditional accounts, we call attention to the potential explanatory 
role of ideology.  In their mapping of migration policy formulation within the European 
Parliament, Hix and Noury (2007: 198) come to the conclusion that regardless of the 
MEP’s left-right position as such ‘MEPs from member states with general more liberal 
political cultures are more pro-migration.’ This suggests the extent of ‘liberalism’ might be 
a key aspect behind the degree of openness. In the same vein, a number of previous studies 
dwell fleetingly on ideology, but, consistently within a vote maximising context. For 
instance, Freeman and Kessler (2008: 669) note ‘Left parties [being] torn between fealty to 
the indigenous working-class component of their base and responding to their intellectual 
and professional supporters’ concern to protect the interests of migrant workers’, reflecting 
an ideological concern over welfare state goals and over economic policies. Along similar 
lines, Perlmutter (1996: 377) claims that ‘Mass parties are more likely to downplay the 
issue, because they face cross-cutting cleavages that affect their core constituencies’. 
Odmalm (2011: 1071; c.f. Schain 2008) suggests ‘a set of potentially conflicting 
ideological streams – market liberalism vs. value conservatism (for the centre-right) and 
international solidarity vs. welfare state/labour market protectionism (for the centre-left) – 
create framing dilemmas’, thus highlighting the fact that contradictory ideological pulls 
within the same party might dissuade the party leaders from politicising immigration 
policies. Moreover, as suggested by Hinnfors et al (2011) ideology appears to have played 
an important role behind the Swedish Social Democrats’ formulation of immigration entry 
policies. 
  
Parties do not just emulate their opponents or follow the majority voter position (Bale et al 
2010) in a crude Downsian fashion. These studies leave unexplained the fact that parties 
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normally operate within a certain ideological framework, which substantially will reduce 
the policy options open to a party leadership. In this paper we will follow the centre-right 
parties’ policy preferences concerning immigration entry policies from the late 1980s to the 
present. This period includes instances with right-wing populist-party threats, as well as 
different public opinion climates, thus allowing us to make at least some claims about the 
importance of ideology in relation to other variables. Throughout, we relate ideology to the 
centre-right parties’ policy formulation and our claim that the formulation of open entry 
policies can be better explained by adding party ideology to the explanatory brew. 
 
Odmalm’s study merits special attention. While we find his observation that immigration 
‘subjects parties to certain ideological “pulls”’ (Odmalm 2011: 1077) fruitful, his claim 
that the ensuing framing dilemmas will lead the parties to non-competition, which will 
explain why immigration is a ‘non-issue in Swedish politics’ (Odmalm 2011: 1072) is less 
convincing. Immigration entry policies have been a recurring theme in Swedish politics 
since at least 1989, and have been so both in periods when anti-immigration parties existed 
and when they did not. As shown in Hinnfors et al (2011) the Swedish Social Democrats 
have been very consistent in their aim for either a status quo regarding entry policies or 
leaning slightly towards more restrictive policies. In the present paper, we will show that 
among the centre-right parties the same consistency, albeit in favour of more open policies, 
is true for all the four parties apart from the Conservatives, who have oscillated between 
open and strict policies. 
 
Labour Migration Policy Debates:  Third-Country Nationals (TCNs) EU Enlargement and 
Circular Migration 
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As the Swedish economy rapidly expanded at the start of the new millennium, and as 
demographic forecasts pointed towards the spectre of a rapidly graying workforce, the 
Confederation of Swedish Employers (Svenskt Näringsliv / SN) began a sustained 
campaign for the relaxation of Sweden’s strict labour migration policies for third-country 
nationals (Fahimi 2001).  Since the early 1970s, similar to most other European states, 
labour migration to Sweden had been sharply limited, with short-term temporary work 
permits being the norm, and with virtually no opportunities for conversion to permanent 
residency. In an initial report, authored by an upcoming Liberal Party politician, a key 
proposal was that employers – and not labour market authorities – should have decision-
making authority as to whether a given potential migrant was appropriate for the position at 
hand, and should be granted a permit (Fahimi 2001:16).  SN economists followed up with a 
more detailed report in spring 2002, as that autumn’s parliamentary election campaign 
increasingly took shape, reasserting the need for employers to have discretion over work 
permit applications as well as freedom of movement for the migrant throughout the sectors 
of the economy and a relatively quick path to permanent residency (Ekenger & Wallen 
2002). The ruling SAP bitterly opposed proposals for a more open labour migration policy, 
with then Prime Minister Göran Persson (2002) dismissing such calls as ‘the dumbest thing 
we could do’ and MPs characterizing the proposals as a ‘neo-liberal wedge’ designed to 
break up the Swedish welfare model (Riksdagen: svar på fråga 2002/03:696). 
 
Both the Greens, who had declared that ‘a more open Sweden leads to a richer society’ 
(Miljöpartiet 2002) and the Liberals, who stressed that “Sweden needs more immigrants, 
not fewer” (Folkpartiet 2002) were enthusiastic and early supporters of the calls for a 
substantially less restrictive labour migration policy.  The four bourgeois parties 
collectively mocked the ruling SAP for ‘happily criticizing us for our desire to let more 
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people come to our land and contribute to both their own and everyone’s well-being’ 
(Lundgren, Svensson, Olofsson, Leijonborg 2002). Similar criticisms of the SAP insistence 
that labour migration was not desirable while domestic unemployment rates remained high 
was also expressed by individual bourgeois parties, such as the Moderate Party’s 
admonishment that ‘it’s up to us to decide whether immigration (will be seen as) as a 
resource for, or a drain on, our society’ (Moderaterna 2002). The central argument 
advanced by all five parties in favour of more open labour migration policies was the 
demand for labour – both short term as evidenced in the number of jobs that were going 
unfilled in certain sectors, as well as long term, in the face of dire labour shortages that 
would have an impact across the Swedish economy. 
 
Despite the SAP victory in the 2002 election, labour migration gained traction when, in 
early 2003, the Greens published a proposal for a socially responsible labour migration.  
SAP policy was portrayed as embodying the principles that ‘global development involves 
open borders for goods and capital, but closed borders for people’ and ‘those who live here 
first have to get jobs before we let others in’ (Miljöpartiet 2003).  In its place, the Greens 
proposed a new set of regulations that were largely similar to those of SN and the Liberals.  
This proposal paved the way for a Blue-Green sponsored parliamentary committee 
investigation into the relaxation of TCN labour migration policy, a move that was firmly 
opposed by the SAP.  When the committee released its final report in autumn 2006, just 
one month after the SAP had suffered a historic defeat at the hands of the four-party 
bourgeois alliance, the majority SAP – Left Party proposals offered little in the way of 
concrete relaxation of the existing rules other than the possibility for limited permit 
renewals and eventual sector-wide access for migrants to job opportunities  (Bucken-
Knapp 2009). Yet, with the support of the Greens, the non-socialist government 
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implemented its desired reform in 2008, stripping unions of their veto power over 
applications, and creating a path to permanent residency for labour migrants that provided 
them with ever broader access to the sectors of the Swedish economy (Regeringens 
proposition 2007/08:147).  In justifying its far-reaching reforms, Minister of Migration 
Tobias Billström stressed how a more liberal entry policy could play an important role in 
preserving a desirable dependency ratio between active workers and the elderly, as well as 
the possibility for knock-on employment effects  (Sveriges Radio 2007). 
 
Simultaneous to the battle over the reform of Sweden’s TCN entry policy, parties were 
embroiled in a debate as to whether transitional rules for citizens from the ten states 
acceding to the EU in May 2004 ought to be adopted. 
 
Initially, the SAP opposed rules that would block the free movement of labour to Sweden 
from Europe’s newest citizens (Svenska Dagbladet 2002).  Yet, this changed in the spring 
of 2003, when a parliamentary committee report (title in English??) highlighted the 
prospect that generous Swedish social services could serve as a powerful pull factor for 
Eastern European migrants (SOU:2002:116).  Following the broadcast of an investigative 
television program focusing on the impact of EU enlargement for Swedish welfare state 
services, Prime Minister Göran Persson speculated that transitional rules might be 
necessary to prevent cases of ‘benefits tourism’ (Aftonbladet 2003).  By spring 2004, the 
SAP had shifted firmly in favor of transitional rules, proposing that work permits and job 
offers be required for the first year that citizens from the new EU member states were 
resident in Sweden, and reserving the possibility that a test of labour market conditions 
could be introduced if deemed necessary – thus potentially putting new EU citizens and 
TCNs on similar footing when seeking employment in Sweden (Skr. 2003/04:119). 
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While the four non-socialist parties were opposed to the SAP’s proposal, they did not adopt 
a joint stance rejecting transitional rules. Centre Party leader Maud Olofsson sharply 
criticized Göran Persson, noting that ‘in the zeal to maintain power, and to avoid taking 
responsibility, (Persson) is feeding an unhealthy welfare nationalism’ (TT Nyhetsbanken 
2004a).  Leading Christian Democratic candidates for the 2004 EU parliamentary elections 
also underscored the party’s opposition to transitional rules, arguing that ‘free movement 
(of peoples) is a fundamental right’ and that any conditions imposed on entry would further 
foster the sense within the new EU member states that they were not being admitted as 
equal members (TT Nyhetsbanken 2004b).  In contrast, both the Liberals and the Moderate 
emerged with separate counter-proposals to that of the SAP.  The Liberals advocated that 
migrants would need to document being in possession of sufficient funds for their first year 
in Sweden  (a stance consistent with their concerns about TCN access to welfare state 
services), but opposed work permits.  This was, however, a deeply divisive issue within the 
party and key members, such as current party chair Erik Ullenhag and current EU Minister 
Birgitta Ohlsson, openly opposed the parliamentary party’s decision.  Non-socialist allies 
also expressed disappointment, with one leading Christian Democrat noting that it felt 
‘particularly difficult that a party that stands for social liberalism would succumb to the 
government’s populism’ (TT Nyhetsbanken 2004c). Senior Moderate Party politicians 
attacked the ruling SAP’s call for transitional rules, noting that while previously ‘a wall 
kept people trapped in Eastern Europe, the Social Democrats want to erect a wall around 
Sweden that will shut them out’.  Yet, the Moderates too advocated some brand of 
transitional rules.  Stressing that the party valued ‘free movement and the right of people to 
build an independent life based on their own work,’ the Moderates proposed residence (not 
work) permits be granted to migrants with offers of employment, and suggesting that 
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phased-in social benefits should be considered (Reinfeldt, Carlsson & Westerberg 2004).  
For their part, the Greens had focused their efforts on joint propositions with the Left Party, 
emphasizing the need for better regulation of migrants seeking independent contractor 
status.  Despite a last minute effort by the SAP to secure a compromise deal with the 
Liberals, in which support would be thrown behind legislation allowing for implementation 
of work permits ‘at a later date’ if necessary, no deal could be reached (Sveriges Television 
2004).  The SAP, Liberals and Moderates each voted in favor of their respective 
propositions, while the remaining parties opposed transitional rules.   
 
While the Blue-Green reform of TCN labour migration policy in 2008 paved the way for 
non-EU citizens to work and settle permanently in Sweden, the governing bourgeois 
alliance was also keenly interested in exploring the degree to which circular migration of 
foreign labour to Sweden could be better facilitated, establishing a parliamentary 
committee of investigation to that end in 2009 (Dir 2009:53).  Here too, the Greens played 
a key role, with a leading figure on the party, MP Mikaela Valtersson, being named chair 
of the committee.  Given our contention that Sweden’s non-socialist parties have been at 
the forefront of efforts to implement more open entry policies, it may seem counterintuitive 
that the current government’s support for circular migration – an ongoing pattern in which 
migrants regularly spend time in both the sending and receiving countries – should be 
counted in that column.  Yet, is should be stressed that support from non-socialist parties 
for circular migration does not represent a retreat from the policy allowing TCNs to settle 
permanently in Sweden.  Indeed, the governing alliance and the Greens regularly highlight 
their desire to extend their liberal migration policies, where possible.  Rather, circular 
migration was deemed warranted both for its potential contribution to development policy 
goals (Skr. 2007/08:89).  While the government acknowledged clear economic benefits for 
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Sweden in terms of greater levels of circular migration (Svenska Dagbladet 2010), such as 
through increased tax receipts, a particular emphasis was placed on how circular migration 
could boost both the economy of the sending country, as well as its level of social capital 
(Dir 2009:53 2).   The committee’s final report, published in April 2011, proposed a 
number of measures that embraced the principle that migrants ought to have the 
opportunity to move back and forth between their homelands and Sweden.  Underpinning 
all proposals was a broad logic that increased migration could make a contribution to 
counteracting demographic trends within Sweden, improve economic development 
opportunities within sending countries, and ‘to the extent where it is possible, people 
should get to choose where and how they will live their lives’ (SOU 2011:28 73). Key 
among these was the proposal that migrants in possession of Swedish permanent residency 
would now be able to leave Sweden for a period of five years without having their permit 
revoked, as opposed to the current one-year rule, provided written notification was 
submitted to the Swedish Migration Board (SOU 2011:28 102). The authors also proposed, 
among other changes, that migrants in possession of Swedish unemployment insurance 
could, under certain conditions, continue to receive payments for a period of three months 
while looking for employment abroad (SOU 2011:28 188), and the ability for students who 
have completed their education to receive a six-month residency permit in order to pursue 
employment  (SOU 2011:28 150). 
 
Perhaps the most controversial reform to emerge in the committee report had to do with the 
proposed ability for asylum seekers to ‘switch tracks’ and pursue legal residency in 
Sweden as labour migrants.  Hardly a new proposal, this had been one of the most 
contentious points of division between the Liberal Party and the SAP during over labour 
migration during the 2002 parliamentary election campaign (Bucken-Knapp 2009). While 
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some possibility existed for asylum seekers to remain in Sweden as labour migrants if their 
application for asylum was unsuccessful, the committee proposed a path for doing so that 
made this a prospect much more within reach (SOU 2011:28 123-25).  SAP committee 
members issued a written dissent on this point, requesting that the ‘switching tracks’ issue 
be analyzed separately, but also noting concern that even with the existing limited 
possibilities for asylum seekers to obtain work permits, ‘cynical employers’ had been 
exploiting immigrants and forcing them to accept working conditions that were not in 
keeping with prevailing agreements (SOU 2011:28 297).   For committee chair Valtersson 
though, the emphasis was clearly on the positive.  Circular migration was framed as a 
‘triple bonus… partly for the individual, partly for the receiving country that benefits from 
competence and new impulses, and partly for the sending country that gets back new 
knowledge’ (Riksdag & Departement 2011). 
 
Taken jointly, some key themes do emerge when considering the proposals put forward by 
the bourgeois parties and the Greens.  First, there is an indictment that Social Democratic 
entry policy has been a protectionist instrument, privileging the political and institutional 
interests of trade unions over that of the shifting needs of the Swedish labour market.  
Second, the desire to break with restrictive stances is partially motivated by arguments 
about the general virtues of openness in a globalized world.  Individuals, the respective 
sending and receiving societies, and the international community as a whole are though to 
benefit economically and culturally from eased cross-border labour flows.  Finally, to a 
great extent, Blue-Green arguments in support of more open entry policies also reflect a 
view of policymaking chiefly as one of problem-solving:  in the face of a demographic 
crisis, where a substantially larger labour pool will be necessary, and where an 
appropriately skilled set of workers is not always on hand, labour migration emerges as a 
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means of achieving economic growth and a sound financial basis for Sweden’s generous 
welfare state services.   
 
Refugee Migration Policy Debates 
 
It is frequently argues that while immigration is very much an ‘issue’ for mainstream 
parties in Europe, it is rarely a dividing factor for Swedish parties (Hammar 1999; Rydgren 
2002; Odmalm 2011). Rather it is assumed that there has been a broad consensus among 
Swedish political parties when it comes to overall migration ambitions and the strategies to 
fulfill them. Although the above assumption may largely be accurate regarding the political 
behavior of the two largest parties the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the Moderate 
Party (M) regarding refugee policy, this assumption is not accurate for mainstream political 
parties as a whole in Sweden. In fact, the last three decades of refugee policy making in 
Sweden can be characterized as highly dynamic and far from consensual. Over the years, 
Swedish refugee policy making has fluctuated between restrictive and open features. In this 
section, we outline the decisions in support of open policies made by centre-right political 
parties in the period 1991-2011. 
 
After the election of 1991, the new centre-right government was formed by the four parties: 
the Centre Party, the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet), the Moderate Party, and the Christian 
Democrats.  One of the new government’s first actions was to withdraw the previous SAP 
government’s bill `An active immigration and refugee policy’, proposed in early 1991. In 
essence, the bill suggested that refugees seeking asylum in Sweden should be granted 
temporary residence permits rather than permanent ones. Instead, refugees should be 
helped back to their home countries as soon as possible, the argument being that this would 
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constitute a more humanitarian and ‘holistic’ policy than inviting the refugees to become 
Swedish citizens with possible future burdens on the welfare state system (Tollefsen & 
Altamirano 1998). The Liberals, with 9.1 percent of the vote, paid extra attention to the 
new government’s asylum policies. The Liberals held the Department for Cultural Affairs 
(which dealt with immigration issues at that time) and were able to mold government 
refugee policies in an increasingly open direction. According to Birgit Friggebo, Liberal 
Minister of Immigration representing in the centre-right coalition government, members of 
her party regarded the refugee policy of the previous SAP government as becoming 
increasingly restrictive (Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 1993/94:76) 
 
The principal object of the Liberals’ criticism was the decision of the SAP government in 
December 1989 popularly known as the `Lucia-decision’. The ‘St Lucia’ (a Swedish 13 
December festival related to Christmas) decision in 1989 was tantamount to a drastic 
tightening of asylum rules; only a strict application of the Geneva convention was to be 
utilised. In a statement, Maj-Lis Lööw, then Social Democratic minister for immigration 
affairs, held that limitations to refugee numbers were essential in order to safeguard a 
dignified reception in the new country (Lundh & Ohlsson 1994: 91). However, the new 
centre-right government took immediate action to reverse this policy by replacing the 
interpretation of the SAP with the previously generous practices of the Aliens Act. 
 
The next step towards more open immigration policies was taken in 1993. On the initiative 
of the Liberals, the centre-right government granted 40,000 Bosnian refugees permanent 
residence permits. In 1992, other European countries, including the Nordic states, had 
already applied Temporary Protection as their means for addressing the refugee wave 
stemming from the Yugoslav crisis (Tollefsen & Altamirano 1998: 90). As a direct result 
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of the centre-right government’s decision, Sweden accepted the greatest number of 
Bosnian refugees among Nordic countries. Other Nordic countries accepted more modest 
amounts, with Denmark accepting 19,000; Norway 10,000; and Finland 1,000. To grant 
permanent residence to Bosnian refugees was by no means straightforward or simple. 
Three policy alternatives were debated prior to the Bosnian decision (Appelqvist 2000; 
Tollefsen & Altamirano 1998.). The first option was to bide one’s time, i.e. take no action. 
The second option was to grant the Bosnians temporary residence permits with a 
subsequent conversion into permanent residence permits should the situation in Bosnia 
deteriorate. Finally, the third option was to grant permanent residence permits from the 
outset. The SAP and Moderate Party advocated temporary permits. The SAP argued that 
the Bosnian National Organisation wanted its citizens back for post war reconstruction and 
that those who received permanent residence permits would lose touch with their 
motherland. As the Swedish standard of living would be higher than in the country of 
origin, it was argued that the refugees would lack incentives to return and thus, Sweden 
would not contribute to reconstruction. Instead, Sweden should make repatriation easy and 
thereby avoid creating new groups of social security dependents. Repeatedly, the Social 
Democrats have been eager to avoid any extra burden on the welfare state. Initially, this 
position was shared by the Moderate Party. However, the Liberals opposed the temporary 
permits proposal and instead advocated permanent residence permits. A contributing factor 
behind the Liberal stance was the fact that many of the refugees had been in the country for 
quite some time. Security and the refugees’ right to regain control over their lives were 
important arguments in favour of the permanent solution (Riksdagens snabbprotokoll 
1993/94:76). Migration minister Birgit Frigebo noted that: 
One can say that the decision was chiefly made within the Liberal Party.  
For me, it wasn’t any obvious decision.  What made it decisive was the 
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situation in the camps.  We received ongoing reports throughout the spring 
that (conditions) were just too awful.  So, it was purely humanitarian, 
when we thought that ‘at least they’ll know -- that in any event they’ll feel 
safe in the knowledge that they can stay.’(Tollefsen/Altamirano, 
1998:104.) 
 
After internal centre-right Government negotiations, permanent residence permits became 
Government policy, which can be regarded as a dramatic break with earlier ongoing moves 
towards ever-stricter policies. The decision to grant permanent residence can be interpreted 
as an expression of liberal ideology. The motives that guided the Liberals’ decision focused 
upon the individual and upon his or her needs and requirements in terms of coping with the 
situation. During the Bosnian crisis, the Liberal line held that very little suggested an 
improvement in conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it would be unreasonable, 
inhuman and destructive to individual refugees to wait for the situation to settle. The 
party’s arguments emphasised core liberal ideas about individual freedoms. It is also 
important to understand the centre-right government’s decision in a wider perspective, 
which is related to the Liberals’ understanding of refugee policy making in general. During 
the period of being a party in opposition, the Liberals were known to criticise the refugee 
policy of both the SAP and the Moderates. On various occasions, the Liberals had 
articulated the view that the generous humanitarian goal of the Swedish refugee policy was 
diminishing. Seen from this perspective, the granting of permanent residence to the 
Bosnians represented the articulation of the particular interests of the Liberals, who with 
three other parties comprised a coalition government. Once in power, the Liberals were in a 
position to reverse a policy it regarded as deeply restrictive.  
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The 1993 decision on permanent residence permits can be regarded as a brief parenthesis 
of openness. When the SAP returned to office in 1994, they reverted to the policies of the 
late 1980s. The 1995 Parliamentary investigation ‘Refugee Policies in a Global 
Perspective’ held that ‘it’s a human right to be able to return to your country. Encouraging 
voluntary returns should constitute an important part of refugee policies’ (SOU 1995:75, 
205). A 1996 Government bill added emphasis to the policy by facilitating voluntary 
returns for all, including those who held permanent residence permits (Government bill 
1996/97:25). Furthermore, a heated debate erupted over purported simulation of semi or 
total paralysis and apathy among young children in families who were about to be expelled 
after having been denied residence permits. The SAP minister in charge, Barbro Holmberg, 
strongly defended a report from the Cabinet’s special co-ordinator, which claimed the 
children were ‘up and running’ at nights when reporters were away and that the children 
were either intoxicated or otherwise induced by their parents to act in order to persuade the 
immigration authorities to grant residence permits to the family. The allegations caused a 
furor among parts of the centre-right opposition and five of the Riksdag’s parties: The 
Liberals, The Christian Democratic Party, The Centre Party, The Left Party and The Green  
demanded the children and their families be given amnesty, including permanent residence 
permits. The demand was turned down by the combined Social Democratic and Moderate 
party votes in a subsequent Riksdag vote. 
 
After 1995, the numbers of newly arrived asylum-seekers fell rapidly (Migrationsverkets 
statistik). In 2006 and 2007, however, Sweden once again became an important destination 
country for asylum-seekers. In 2007, the Swedish Board of Migration registered a total of 
36,207 applications for asylum, more than any other EU state. The high figures 
experienced by Sweden can primarily be explained by a significant increase in the flow of 
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refugees from Iraq since 2006, a result of the enactment of a temporary asylum Act, in 
force from November 2005 to March 2006. The Act made it easier to obtain a residence 
permit, especially for families with children who had been in Sweden for a lengthy period. 
The Act was pushed forward by a grand coalition of grassroots movements, religious 
communities and political parties, again with the exception of the SAP and the Moderates. 
 
In the spring 2011 the four government parties (The Moderates, The Christian Democrats, 
The Centre Party, and The Liberals) forged a comprehensive framework agreement with 
The Greens. Among other things, the agreement aims to give illegal immigrants the right to 
healthcare and education and would give them the right to run businesses. The move 
follows long negotiations between the smaller governing parties (The Centre,The Liberals 
and The Christian Democrats) who have long argued for more rights for undocumented 
migrants, and the Moderate Party, which opposed the idea. Migration minister Tobias 
Billström (M) has previously argued that giving such entitlements would legitimize people 
who have no right to be in Sweden (SR Ekot 30/10 2008). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Thus far, we have been able to show that Swedish non-socialist parties have a strong 
record of supporting comparatively more open entry policies for both labour migrants 
and asylum seekers. In this section, we attempt to make sense of what is, for many, a 
counter-intuitive result.  After all, the Swedish case has emerged as something of a 
mirror image to that of the standard portrayal of entry policy preferences held by 
mainstream political parties:  among mainstream actors, it is not the non-socialists 
who have championed restrictive measures, it has been the centre-left -- the once 
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hegemonic SAP.  In reflecting on the Swedish case, it is not our aim to argue that the 
support of Swedish non-socialist parties can be accounted for by one factor alone. 
 Rather, we wish to highlight how the preferences held by these parties indicate 
limitations of several key contenders used for analyzing party behavior in the realm of 
immigration policy, and how the limits of their explanatory capacity allows us to take 
the first critical step in another direction:  considering the role of party ideology. 
 
As shown in Table 2, several non-socialist parties have more or less consistently 
formulated open policies. These empirical observations are counter-intuitive, 
provoking us to seek new explanations concerning the emergence of open 
immigration entry policies. Apparently, open policies were formulated by non-
socialist parties in spite of success at the polls for anti-immigration parties. At the 
same time, the main contender for government power, the SAP, did not move in an 
open direction. Likewise, there is no immediate relationship between public opinion 
trends and the stance on entry policies taken by neither the non-socialist parties nor 
the SAP. Table 2 provides the fundamentals for a formalized explanatory analysis 
concerning party policy choice given various strategic contexts. By using the 
information provided by the table’s columns we are able to indicate the degree of 
‘Anti-Immigration Party’ and Xenophobic Public Opinion’ threats the mainstream 
parties have been exposed to at various 1989-2011 intervals. The columns to the far 
right indicate whether the parties have formulated ‘Restrictive’ (‘R’) or ‘Open’ (‘O’) 
policies. As can be readily shown through Table 2, ‘High’ and ‘Low’ levels of ‘Anti-
Immigration Party Threat’ do not correlate with non-socialist immigration policy (nor 
with those of the SAP). These results cast doubt on the vote maximization arguments. 
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
 
It is comparatively easy to demonstrate how the Swedish case does not square perfectly 
with the logic of prevailing accounts.  Unlike literature emphasizing how shifts in the party 
system will provide certain inducements for centre-right actors to back restrictive entry 
polices --  chiefly as a result of the increased electoral fortunes of populist parties – this has 
not been the case in Sweden.  In the four electoral cycles when anti-immigration have 
constituted a realist party threat to the established parties, 1991-94, 2002-06, 2006-10 and 
2010-, Swedish non-socialist parties have made support for various open entry policy 
measures a visible component of their politics, both in terms of labour migration and 
refugee /asylum seekers. Over the course of the last three periods, the populist SD steadily 
grew in strength, capturing significant numbers of seats in local government and achieving 
its long-held goal of Riksdag representation in 2010.  Yet, Swedish non-socialist parties 
have remained the key actors pushing for implementation of policies making it 
comparatively easier for foreigners to come and settle in Sweden.  Even prior to the formal 
advent of SD, non-socialist parties made their mark on Swedish migration policy by 
implementing a distinctly more open entry policy for refugees and asylum seekers in the 
early 1990s – the period in which the populist New Democracy had its brief but strong 
parliamentary success. Moreover, although the populist ND and SD parties' were heavily 
critisised by all mainstream parties it has not been the case that strict immigration entry 
policies have been anathema as such. As strict labour migration policies were continuously 
standard SAP policy and, at times, stricter refugee /asylum policies too, it would have been 
perfectly easy for the non-socialist parties to join them in order to stave off any right-wing 
threats -- but they did not do so. Moreover, in spite of the SAP's overall party system 
interest in creating a red-green bloc against the centre-right government post-2006, the 
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SAP has not been able to share policies with the Greens on the issue of immigration entry 
policies. Our suggestion is that the underlying ideologies differed between the SAP and the 
non-socialist parties, thus preparing the triumph for different policies. 
 
By the same token, public opinion is only of limited utility for making sense of the stance 
by Swedish non-socialist parties in support of open entry policies.  As one example, 
surveys in 2002 and 2003 showed that substantial majorities favoured allowing TCNs with 
employment offers to come to Sweden (Bucken-Knapp 2009).  Likewise, studies show that 
public opinion regarding refugee numbers have dropped from the 1990s to the 2000s 
(although still relatively high). At first glance, such evidence would appear to cast doubt on 
our claim that public opinion is not crucial for shaping a given party’s entry policy 
preferences.  After all, if public opinion is strongly supportive of labour migration, and 
political parties visibly support it, wouldn’t one argue this has the makings of a causal 
linkage? And if voters become more understanding and accepting about relatively high 
refugee numbers and parties actually formulate and implement more open policies, 
wouldn't that indicate an explanatory relationship? However, we doubt that public opinion 
is such a strict determinant of entry policy preferences for one important reason:  at the 
same time as the Swedish public was strongly in support of more relaxed entry policies, the 
ruling SAP was vehemently opposed to it.  Indeed, in 2002, support for a less restrictive 
migration policy was high even among SAP voters (63 percent) and a majority of LO 
members (59 percent).  Further, in 2003, the respective percentage of SAP supporters and 
LO members supporting labour migration had increased (Bucken-Knapp 2009). In the 
same vein, we notice that while voter support for refugees increased (Demker 2010), the 
SAP refrained from joining the various centre-right policy agreements regarding less strict 
legislation concerning refugees. If parties formulate entry policies with one eye on voters, 
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be it the electorate as a whole, or their most loyal support base, then we would have 
expected that all mainstream Swedish parties would have moved sharply in the direction of 
open entry policies and not just the non-socialists. Moreover, there was no denying that 
populist parties had in fact attracted substantial numbers of voters who supported 
restrictive entry policies.  Indeed, the SAP's unwillingness to move in a more open 
direction could be interpreted as as a Downsian form of policy adaptation to public opinion 
moods. Again, a comparison between the parties reveal flaws in the argument, as non-
socialist parties took a completely opposite policy path from that of the SAP. Given that 
there is nothing in the public opinion hypothesis that suggests it is limited to only one party 
of families, we find this hypothesis lacking. 
 
Yet, if non-socialist parties are not driven to support open entry policies on the basis of 
inter-party competition or the pulls of public opinion, is it possible that opening Sweden’s 
borders to increased levels of migration can simply be regarded as the rational act of 
policymakers solely interested in solving pressing economic problems or ensuring 
compliance with international norms for humanitarian treatment of displaced and 
persecuted peoples?  Here too, at first glance, one might think the Swedish case lends 
support to the thesis of policymakers as problem-solvers.  As Bleich (2002) notes, this 
literature portrays actors as ‘responding to problems by implementing new and better 
policy solutions arrived at through processes of learning.’ Cross-national differences in 
policy responses are thought to stem from differences in local conditions and the lessons 
learned from previous attempts at solving the given policy problem.  However, this more 
technocratic account is ill-suited for application to the Swedish case.  Given that both non-
socialist parties and the SAP are facing the same policy challenge – be it in the form of 
demographic shortages or foreign citizens seeking protection – a problem-solving 
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perspective cannot be utilized for making sense of sharply divergent responses by 
competing actors. 
 
Thus, if both conventional accounts of migration policy preference formation, and more 
technocratic accounts of policy makers as problem-solvers have clear limitation, what 
possible explanation is left?  We argue that in order to make sense of why Swedish non-
socialist parties have such a strong record of backing open entry policies, one needs to 
consider the role of ideology as the missing explanatory factor. Even though we concede 
that parties may have contradictory elements within their overarching ideologies, we 
believe previous research has exaggerated the extent to which these elements are equally 
influential. One or the other of the ideological strands most likely takes the upper hand and 
will do so more or less continuously. This helps to clarify why it is that political battles 
over immigration entry policies have come back so regularly and have been so similar and 
the contestants so predictable over at least thirty years. 
 
When one looks at the overall picture, there is a sufficient trail of evidence pointing 
towards the role of ideology in shaping the entry policy preferences of Swedish non-
socialist parties. Quite consistently, open policies have been supported by referring to 
liberal principles about basic human liberties. As regards labour migration, a recurrent 
theme has been about market-led immigration rather than state planning as the norm. 
Likewise, arguments about more open policies have been sharply critical of social 
democratic, corporatist solutions involving tri-partite arrangements where the state, the 
unions and the employers strike bargains and reach political compromises.   
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The non-socialist parties have not always acted as a unified bloc regarding entry policies. 
Occasionally, the Moderates have perceived refugee migration flows to Sweden as 
problematic. However, given the Swedish party structure, the Moderates have had many 
reasons to close ranks with the other non-socialist parties to present a government 
alternative. These strategic fundamentals would perhaps lend some credence to the party 
system explanatory factor and we do indeed acknowledge its importance. However, at the 
same time, we emphasize that it has been the Moderates' overaching ideological goal to 
challenge the SAP’s vision of how Swedish society ought to be organized and 
administered. Moreover, even prior to the establishment of the four-party non-socialist 
alliance in 2004, the Moderate Party has advocated -- on its own and in conjunction with 
the other non-socialist parties -- a labour migration reform chiefly relying on market 
dynamics. 
 
Throughout, the Liberals and the Christian Democrats have advocated strong moral and 
ethical values inherent in the responsibility to protect refugees with The Christian 
Democrats referring to Christian moral values and the Liberals to individual rights. For 
example, during the Bosnian refugee crisis the 'individualism line' held that it would be 
unreasonable, inhuman and destructive to the individual refugee to wait for the situation to 
settle or to take individual responsibility for any 'national' or 'state' Bosnian considerations. 
 
Swedish debates over immigration policy have, in fact, substantially mirrored the 
respective visions held by the socialist bloc (Social Democrats and the Left Party) and the 
non-socialist bloc (the Moderate, Centre, Liberal and Christian Democrat’s and perhaps 
Greens) towards both the welfare state and the regulation of the labour market. Even 
though welfare state institutions rarely change overnight, it appears that the political 
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paradigms of different welfare states represent useful analytical tools when it comes to 
understanding different attitudes towards migration. The Swedish socialist parties 
traditionally advocate a strong welfare state with benefits, rights and duties for all its 
citizens. This system is thus highly redistributive in accordance to its norm of ensuring 
equality. On the contrary, the Swedish Liberals construct their policies on the political and 
ideological assumption that does not centre on the dismantling of the Swedish welfare 
state. Rather, while the Liberals and other non-socialist parties broadly support that the 
broad entitlements of the welfare state should remain intact, these should only be accessed 
after the individual has exhausted most reasonable attempts at securing employment.   
 
On balance then, the contribution of this paper is a modest, albeit important, one to debates 
over political parties and entry policy preference formation.  At the most empirical level of 
analysis, we have clearly documented that non-socialist parties in Sweden have been at the 
forefront of open door policies, both with regards to labour migration and those concerning 
refugees and asylum seekers.  This stands in sharp contrast to both research literature -- and 
a popular perception -- that parties of the centre-right and their allies are generally the 
sources of restrictive immigration policies. Whether this pattern is borne out in other 
settings remains to be seen.  In terms of prevailing theoretical accounts of parties and entry 
policy preferences, the Swedish case highlights the need to consider more a more nuanced 
set of dynamics.  There is no doubt that parties have a chief aim of securing votes in order 
to govern or exercise influence.  To that end, both an awareness of inter-party competitive 
dynamics and the tides of public opinion are crucial.  But parties do not move about in this 
strategic environment blindly when formulating entry policy.  As we have argued, they do 
so with the aid of ideology.  The task for researchers now is to better specify how ideology 
exerts an influence on the formation of migration policy preferences -- both for non-
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socialist and socialist parties, and both in Sweden and beyond.  There is no denying that 
earlier research has convincingly shown that right-of-centre parties in many European 
settings have indeed moved towards stricter immigration policies. However, for future 
studies, we suggest a more narrow exploration of whether and how ideology matters, 
particularly where conclusions have perhaps prematurely been reached as to the decisive 
role of far-right populist parties in shaping the European immigration policy agenda. To a 
great extent, this will involve a re-analysis of many settings where the politics of migration 
policy have previously been examined.  This is undoubtedly a complex and time-
consuming process-tracing exercise, but it is a valuable one.  
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Table 1. Swedish Parties 1989-2011 Immigration Entry Policy Stances* 
Swedish Guvernements  Key Policy Decision and 
Restrictiveness/Openness 
(R = Restrictive, O = Open) 
Supporting Party(ies) 
1989‐1991 SAP  R: Strict application of the Geneva 
convention + temporary residence permits 
only (1989) 
 
 
SAP+M 
 
 
 
 
1991‐1994 NON SOC (M, L, C, K)  O: Permanent residence permits 
reintroduced; notion of ’refugee’ widened  
(1993) 
 
O: Decision to grant permanent             
residence to  Bosnian refugees. 
 
R: Temporary residence permits 
reintroduced (permanent possible)  
 
 
NON SOC (L, C, K, M) 
 
 
 
NON SOC (L, C, K, M) 
 
 
 
NON SOC (L, C, K, M)+SAP 
 
1994‐2006 SAP  R: Labour migration restrictions regarding 
new EU member states** (2004) 
 
O: No labour migration restrictions 
regarding new EU member states** (2004) 
 
R: Deportation possible even in cases 
where child suffers from ’apathy stress 
syndrome’ (2006) 
 
O:  Enactment  of  a  temporary  Asylum  Act. 
The  Act  made  it  easier  to  obtain  a 
residence  permit  for,  primarily,  families 
with children who have been in Sweden for 
a long time.            
SAP+Left party 
 
 
NON SOC (M,L,C,K,G) 
 
 
SAP + M 
 
 
 
NON SOC (L,C,K,G)+Left party 
2006‐2011 NON SOC (M, L, C, K)  O: Labour market immigration from non EU 
countries reintroduced (2007) 
 
O: Measures to facilitate greater circular 
migration debated and proposed 
 
O: Asylum seekers whose application for  
residency has been rejected but who 
remain in the country without permission, 
have received an increased right to 
education,  health care and  the right to run 
businesses 
NON SOC (M,L,C,K,G) 
 
 
NON SOC (M,L,C,K,G) 
 
NON SOC (M,L,C,K,G) 
SAP:Social Democratic Party; M: Moderate Party; L: Liberal party; C: Centre Party; K: Christian Democrats, G: Green Party 
*) R = Restrictive = Parties refer to their policies as ‘strict’and/or  declare that the number of entrants should be limited and/or 
declare that current legislation should be implemented ‘efficiently’ and/or declare that entry legislation should become 
tighter/stricter and/or declare that asylum should be given on the condition of return and/or declare that various abuses of the 
asylum system should be penalised; O=Open= Parties refer to their policies as ‘open’ or ’liberal’ or ‘humane’ and/or  declare 
that the number of entrants should be increased and/or declare that current legislation should be interpreted liberally and/or 
declare that immigration rights should be extended to new groups (Gudbrandsen 2010: 254 f.). 
**) Please note that the minority SAP government’s restrictive proposal for transitional arrangements for citizens from the new 
EU member states was defeated in parliament by the joint votes from non‐socialist and green parties in favour of an open 
policy. 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Table 2.  Immigration Policy Decisions in Relation to Several Strategic Contexts 
Swedish 
Governments Anti-Immigration
Party 
Election 
Result 
Degree 
of Anti-
Immigra
tion 
Party 
Threat 
Degree of 
Public 
Opinion 
Xenophobi
c Threat 
Key Policy Decision 
and 
Restrictiveness/Open
ness 
(R = Restrictive, O = 
Open) 
Supporting 
Party(ies) 
  
1989-1991 SAP   0   None   No Data 
R: Strict application of the 
Geneva convention + 
temporary residence permits 
only (1989)  
SAP+M 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
1991-94 NON 
SOC (M, L, C, K) 
  
  
  
  
91-94 (ND): 
6.7% 
  
  
  
  
HIGH 
  
  
  
  
HIGH 
O: Permanent residence 
permits reintroduced; notion 
of ’refugee’ widened  
(1993) 
  
O: Decision to grant 
permanent           
residence to  Bosnian 
refugees. 
  
R: Temporary residence 
permits reintroduced 
(permanent possible)  
  
 
NON SOC (L, C, K, M) 
  
  
  
  
NON SOC (L, C, K, M) 
  
  
   
NON SOC (L, C, K, 
M)+SAP 
  
  
  
   
  
  
1994-2006 SAP 
    
94 (ND): 
1.2% 
  
  
 
98 (SD): 
0.4% 
  
   
02 (SD): 
1.4% 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
LOW 
  
94-98: 
HIGH 
  
 
 
 
99-01: 
MEDIUM 
  
02-03: 
MEDIUM/HI
GH 
  
  
04: HIGH 
  
  
05-06: 
MEDIUM 
R: Labour migration 
restrictions regarding new 
EU member states (2004; NB 
rejected by the Riksdag) 
  
O: No labour migration 
restrictions regarding new 
EU member states (2004; NB 
carried by the Riksdag) 
  
R: Deportation possible even 
in cases where child suffers 
from ’apathy stress 
syndrome’ (2006) 
  
O: Enactment of a temporary 
Asylum Act. The Act made it 
easier to obtain a residence 
permit for, primarily, families 
with children who have been 
in Sweden for a long time. 
           
SAP+Left party 
  
   
 
 
 
NON SOC (M,L,C,K,G) 
  
   
 
 
SAP + M 
  
  
  
 
NON SOC 
(L,C,K,G)+Left party 
  
  
   
  
  
2006-2011 NON 
SOC (M, L, C, K) 
  
  
06 (SD): 
2.9% 
  
  
10 (SD): 
5,7% 
  
  
  
  
  
 
HIGH 
  
  
  
  
  
07-11: 
MEDIUM 
O: Labour market 
immigration from non EU 
countries reintroduced (2007) 
  
O: Measures to facilitate 
greater circular migration 
debated and proposed 
  
O: Asylum seekers whose 
application for  residency has 
been rejected but who 
remain in the country without 
permission, have received an 
increased right to education,  
health care and  the right to 
run businesses 
 
NON SOC (M,L,C,K,G) 
  
   
 
NON SOC (M,L,C,K,G) 
  
  
 
 
 
 
NON SOC (M,L,C,K,G) 
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